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ABSTRACT 
 
Insider Trading at the Turn of the Century: Two Essays. (December 2008) 
Semih Tartaroglu, B.S., Bilkent University; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
 Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Ekkehart Boehmer 
 
Insider trading may convey information to the market and promote accurate 
pricing of stocks. In this dissertation, I investigate insider trading at the turn of the 
century.  
In the first essay, I investigate insider trading activity in technology stocks during 
the high price - high volatility period of the late 1990s. I document that insiders of 
technology firms were heavy sellers during the ten month pre-peak period in which stock 
prices more than doubled. The technology stocks that were sold by insiders more 
extensively in the pre-peak period had lower returns in the post-peak period. I 
furthermore investigate the relation between the net order flows (buyer initiated minus 
seller initiated trades) and abnormal insider trading activity. I document that the net 
order flow is positively related to abnormal insider trading activity. However, this 
positive relation becomes weaker in the peak period; which implies less price discovery 
through insider trading during the rise of technology stock prices.  
In the second essay, I document that disclosure requirements significantly affect 
insider trading behavior. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires expedited and on-line 
 iv
disclosure of insider transactions. This increase in the visibility of insider trading reduces 
informational advantage of insiders and increases the likelihood of facing legal sanctions 
for insiders. I document that insider purchases significantly declined after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. In addition, the incidences of insider purchases (sales) prior to positive 
(negative) earnings surprises declined after the Act. Finally, I document that the earnings 
announcements become more informative after the Act, which is consistent with less 
price discovery through insider trading prior to earnings announcements. However, the 
evidence that the decline in insider trading contributes to more informative earnings 
announcements is pronounced for insider purchases but not for insider sales. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Insider trading may convey information to the market and promote accurate 
pricing of stocks. In this dissertation, I investigate two special issues on insider trading at 
the turn of the century. The title of the first essay is “Insider Trading During the 
Technology Bubble”, the title of the second essay is “Insider Trading and Earnings 
Surprises: The Case of Expedited Disclosure of Insider Transactions”.  
I.1  Insider Trading During the Technology Bubble 
The NASDAQ index reached its highest level in March 2000 but by the end of 
that year half of the returns gained over the previous two years were wiped out. This run-
up in technology stock prices preceding the precipitous decline is commonly called the 
technology bubble1. In this study, I investigate insider trading during this special period.  
Recent studies question whether the trading behavior of various market 
participants was different during this special period. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) 
show that hedge funds were buying during the price run-up but they were also successful 
avoiding the downturn2. Two studies (Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu (2005), Dass, Massa 
and Patgiri (2008)) show that institutional investors were herding during this period. 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Financial Economics.  
 
1 Earlier studies suggest that the dramatic rise and fall of technology stock prices is difficult to justify with 
fundamentals (e.g., Shiller (2000), Ofek and Richardson (2002), Lamont and Thaler (2003). Pastor and 
Veronesi (2006) show that the high prices and high volatilities can be generated in a rational model. 
DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2008) show that financial bubbles can emerge due to rational investors’ 
relative wealth concerns. 
2 These findings are consistent with models in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and De Long et al. (1990) 
which suggest that sophisticated investors might rationally ride price bubbles. 
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These studies suggest that hedge funds’ and institutional investors’ trading activity 
contributed to the rise of technology stock prices. Complementing these studies, I 
address two questions on insider trading activity during this special period. Specifically, 
I question how insiders traded during the rise of technology stock prices and whether or 
not insider trading activity affected the trading behavior of other investors.  
Insiders, with superior information, generally are referred to as informed traders. 
The vast amount of literature on insider trading implies that insider trading activity helps 
to keep prices close to the fundamentals.3 In the seminal paper of Kyle (1985) market 
makers try to infer the information of insiders from their trading activity. In this study, I 
limit the definition of insiders to the top management of firms (CEO, Chair, President, 
Officers and Board of Directors)4. I first investigate insider trading activity around price 
peaks and then I examine the relation between insider activity and net order flow (buyer 
initiated-seller initiated trades).  
Technology stocks are research intensive and subject to large information 
asymmetry5. Moreover, the late 1990s were characterized by technological changes such 
as the internet, wireless communications, and advances in pharmaceutical industry. 
Insiders of tech-stocks are likely to interpret the effects of technological changes on their 
firms’ cash flows better and faster than an average investor. Hence, aggregate insider 
                                                 
3 Earlier studies such as Jaffe (1974), Seyhun (1986) and Rozeff and Zaman (1988), Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001) document that insiders can predict abnormal future stock price changes and their transactions earn 
abnormal profits. Purnanandam and Seyhun (2007) document that outsiders may profit from mimicking 
insider transactions.  
4 According to SEC rules, individuals or institutions that own more than 10% of a firm are also classified 
as insider.  
5 Aboody and Lev (2000) document that transactions of insiders at firms with intensive research and 
development activity earns larger abnormal returns compared to those of insiders at firms with no research 
and development activity. 
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trading activity at technology stocks should be a signal about fundamentals. I document 
heavy sales of technology stock insiders in the ten months prior to the price peaks in 
which the prices more than doubled.   
Recent studies (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (2004)) show that net order flow is positively related to stock returns. 
Boehmer and Wu (2007) show that net order flow from different trader types play 
different roles in price formation. Earlier studies (i.e., Givoly and Palmon (1985), 
Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakvarty and McConnell (1997)) 
document that insider trading facilitates rapid price discovery. Consistent with 
microstructure theories, the abnormal insider trading activity may be a signal of private 
information. When insiders trade excessively, other market participants may realize 
existence of an informed trader and insiders’ information will be incorporated to the 
prices. To the extent other market participants follow the insiders there will be net order 
flow in the same direction of insider trading activity.   
I investigate the relation between abnormal insider trading activity and net order 
flow on a sample of 1,345 stocks from January 1996 to August 2002. I measure 
abnormal insider trading as the difference between net insider trading (purchases minus 
sales scaled by firms’ outstanding shares) and its time series mean. I document that net 
order flow is positively related to abnormal insider trading. More interestingly, this 
relation was economically and statistically weaker prior to the price peaks. 
Meulbroek (2000) argues that managers of internet firms have an incentive to sell 
their share holdings because of the high volatility of these stocks. Hence, insider sales 
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may be driven by their portfolio rebalancing needs that are exacerbated by rising prices 
and high volatilities during this period. I document that the sales of technology stock 
insiders in the pre-peak period were large even after controlling for portfolio rebalancing 
needs (price run-up and volatility) of insiders.  
I also investigate the relation between insider trading activity before the peak and 
the returns after the peak. If insider trading was only driven by portfolio rebalancing 
needs (a naïve contrarian strategy), then there should be no relation between insider 
trading in the pre-peak period and the returns in the post peak period. If insider trading 
contained information, then their trading activity in the pre-peak period should predict 
price declines after the peaks. I show that technology stocks that were sold extensively 
by insiders in the pre-peak period earned larger negative returns during the correction 
period. Hence, the large tech-insider selling in the pre-peak period contained 
information.  
I also investigate the relation between the post peak returns and lagged abnormal 
tech-insider trading activity in the pre-peak period. I document that even the abnormal 
sales in the tenth month prior to the peaks predict the cross section of price declines after 
the peaks. This evidence suggests that it took markets many months to incorporate 
negative information from tech-insider trading.  
In a recent study, Marin and Oliver (2007), document that insiders sell many 
months (up to 12 months) before a large monthly price drop, but insiders buy only one 
month before a large monthly price jump. In this study, I specifically investigate insider 
trading during the technology bubble in which other sophisticated investors’ trading 
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contributed to the rising prices. I document that tech-insiders were heavy sellers up to 
ten months before the price peaks. The evidence in this essay and in Marin and Oliver 
(2007) implies that insider sales contain information.  
There are two studies that investigate the behavior of insiders at internet IPOs. 
Schultz and Zaman (2001) argue that the motivation behind internet IPOs was “to grab 
market share” rather than “to issue overpriced stocks”. Ofek and Richardson (2003) 
attribute the burst of the bubble to IPO lock up expirations and associated insider 
selling6. In contrast to these studies, I investigate insider trading in stocks that are 
already listed on exchanges. The findings in this essay complement Ofek and Richardson 
(2003) by showing that insiders of technology stocks that are already listed at exchanges 
were sellers many months before the peaks.  
The overall evidence of this essay suggests that the markets ignored (or failed to 
recognize) the negative information from tech-insider trading during this period. The 
findings of this study are important within the limits to arbitrage literature that 
recognizes different factors (i.e. short sale constraints, synchronization risk or behavioral 
factors) to explain price bubbles. Complementing this strand of literature, this essay 
highlights another missing factor during the bubbles. The information from insider 
trading that facilitates faster price discovery and that helps to keep prices close to the 
fundamentals is not fully and timely incorporated to prices during the bubble periods.  
                                                 
6 Battalio and Shultz (2006) show that short sale constraints are not enough to explain the “bubble”. 
Recent working paper by Schultz (2007) argues that increased supply of shares do not explain the burst of 
the bubble.  
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I.2  Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises: The Case of Expedited Disclosure of 
Insider Transactions 
Insider trading is heavily regulated in the US. Insiders who trade on private 
information face a trade-off between their benefits (profit from trading) and their costs 
(level of legal sanctions and probability of facing legal sanctions). The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 requires expedited and on-line disclosure of insider transactions and makes 
insider trading more visible.7 However, the Act not only decreases the informational 
advantage of an insider but also increases the likelihood of facing legal sanctions of an 
insider. As a consequence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is likely to deter insider trading and 
the price discovery through insider trading.  
Prior literature investigates the effectiveness of federal regulations that increased 
legal sanctions on insider trading during the 1980s.8 Seyhun (1992) documents that 
changes in insider trading regulations in the 1980s did not deter insider trading. 
Garfinkel (1997) shows that increased legal sanctions deterred insider trading prior to 
earnings announcements. In this study, I investigate how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
affected insider trading; in particular I explore whether expedited disclosure 
requirements affects insider trading behavior around earnings announcements.9 
Insider trading may convey information to the market and promote accurate 
pricing of stocks. Consistent with this view, Roulstone (2006) shows that insiders’ 
                                                 
7 See Section II for a summary on insider trading disclosure requirements changed by the Act.  
8 The Insider Trading Sanctions Act (ITSA) of 1984 provides up to three times the insiders’ illegal profits 
in civil penalties and a ten-fold increase in criminal penalties.  The  Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Act (ITSFEA) of  1989 increases maximum penalties to $1 million and 10 years of prison and holds top 
management responsible for failure to comply with regulation by any employee of the firm. 
9 Theoretical models presented by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Huddart et al. (2001), Mendelson and 
Tunca (2004) suggest that disclosure requirements affect informed insider trading.  
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decisions to trade are influenced by future earnings announcement returns and insider 
trades are negatively related to market reactions to earnings announcements. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires expedited disclosure of insider transactions and hence the 
Act is likely to deter insider trading on price relevant information. This should imply that 
the positive relation between insider trading and future earnings surprises is weaker after 
the Act. More importantly, the price discovery through insider trading should shift to 
other sources such as financial reports or earnings announcements. Hence, earnings 
announcements should become more informative after the Act.    
I consider a four year period before and after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in 
2002 and examine a sample of more than 10,000 quarterly earnings announcements. I 
investigate open market transactions by the top management of firms (CEO, Chair, 
President, Officers and Board of Directors) around these quarterly earnings 
announcements.10 I show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a significant impact on insider 
trading behavior. In particular, I find that insider transactions which are likely to be 
based on information declined after the Act. I document that earnings announcements 
become more informative after the Act which is consistent with less price discovery 
through informed trading prior to earnings announcements. However, I find little 
evidence that the decline in insider trading contributed to more informative earnings 
announcements after the Act.  
                                                 
10 According to SEC rules, individuals or institutions that own more than 10% of a firm are also classified 
as insider. I limit the definition of insiders to top management since they are the decision makers of the 
firms.   
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The evidence that the Act affected informed insider trading is based on two sets 
of results. First, I assume that certain insider trades are more likely to be based on 
private information. Then, I formally investigate the net insider trading activity and 
earnings surprises. 
Insiders receive shares of their company through their compensation packages 
and they typically have undiversified portfolios. Hence, insider sales may be driven by 
their information advantage or their liquidity needs. Insider purchases are more likely to 
be driven by their information given their undiversified portfolios. I document that 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not deter insider sales but insider purchases declined 
significantly after the Act.  
 Moreover, I investigate pre-announcement and post-announcement informed 
trading by stratifying the data around positive and negative earnings surprises. The 
obvious examples of pre-announcement informed trading are insider purchases before 
positive earnings surprises and insider sales before negative earnings surprises. I 
document that the incidences of insider purchases (sales) prior to positive (negative) 
earnings surprises declined after the Act.   
The examples of post-announcement informed trading are insider purchases after 
negative news and insider sales after positive news. Insiders may defer their purchases 
(sales) until after upcoming negative (positive) earnings surprises and profit from price 
movements after the release of negative or positive news. It is more difficult to argue 
that these transactions are solely insiders’ deferred transactions to exploit the price 
movements after the announcements. Hence, the likelihood of legal sanctions on post-
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announcement informed trades are lower. I show that the incidences of insider purchases 
after negative earnings surprises declined after the Act. But the decline in incidences of 
insider purchases after negative surprises is less than the decline in incidences of pre-
announcement purchases. On the other hand, I find that the incidences of insider sales 
following positive earnings announcements increased after the Act.  These findings 
suggest that the Act did not deter informed post-announcement trading. 
As an alternative test of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's effects on information based 
trading, I examine the relation between insider trading activity and the magnitude of 
earnings surprises before and after the Act. I find that insider trading is not significantly 
related to the magnitude of upcoming earnings surprises neither before nor after the Act. 
On the other hand, I find that insiders increased their tendency to trade against just 
announced earnings information after the Act. The relation between net insider trading 
activity and recent earnings surprises becomes significantly more negative after the Act. 
These results suggest that insiders increased their relative emphasis on post-event versus 
pre-event informed trading, after the Act.  
Finally, I examine the informativeness of earnings announcements before and 
after the Act. I find that the earnings response coefficient is larger after the Act, 
consistent with less informed trading and price discovery prior to earnings 
announcements. 11 However, I find little evidence that decline in informed trading 
contributed to more informative earnings announcements. Prior to the Act, insider 
purchase transactions are negatively related to price reactions of earnings 
                                                 
11 The earnings response coefficient is the coefficient of earnings surprise in a regression of market price 
reaction around announcement days on earnings surprise. 
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announcements, consistent with the view that insider purchases cause price discovery 
before earnings announcements (the more insiders purchase prior to earnings 
announcement, the less price reaction to earnings announcement). And the negative 
relation between insider purchases and price reactions is reversed after the Act. 
However, the tests that utilize net insider trading activity or insider sales yield 
statistically insignificant results.   
The affects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on insider trading and the relation between 
insider trading and earning surprise have policy implications. The Act was passed in 
response to corporate scandals around the turn of the century and it is subject to 
revisions. Actually, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has requested systematic 
empirical evidence pertaining to the Act. Moreover, recently the Act has been criticized 
for being too restrictive and costly for US corporations and capital markets.12  
 
                                                 
12 Zhang (2007) shows that the Act and its provisions have imposed significant net costs on firms. Engel 
et al. (2007) point to unintended consequences of the Act by documenting an increase in going-private 
decisions following  the Act. 
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CHAPTER II 
INSIDER TRADING DURING THE TECHNOLOGY BUBBLE 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. The Section II.1 describes the data and 
sample, Section II.2. explains the methodology and discusses the empirical results, 
Section IV includes the robustness tests. 
II.1  Data and Sample 
 In this study, I use data from four different sources. I get insider trading data 
from Thomson Financial Network (TFN). I use data from the Center for Research in 
Security prices (CRSP) for stock returns and the CRSP/Compustat merged database for 
accounting data. I use NYSE Trades and Automated Quotations (TAQ) database for the 
transactions and quote data. I merge insider trading data from TFN with daily CRSP data 
using historical CUSIP numbers. The sample includes firms with common stocks (share 
code 10 and 11) that trade at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), at the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and at the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). I follow Lakonishok and Lee (2001) to filter 
insider trading data for inconsistencies between TFN and CRSP.13 I investigate only 
open-market transactions by top management (CEOs, chairman of board, CFOs, 
directors, officers, and executives).  
                                                 
13 Due to erroneous reporting of insider transactions, I delete the following insider transactions: (i) the 
transactions with missing prices and number of shares; (ii)the transactions with price which is not within 
twenty percent range of daily CRSP price; (iii) the transactions in which  number of shares an insider 
trades is  larger than twenty percent of firms’ outstanding shares; (iv) the transactions less than 100 shares; 
(iv) the transactions in which number of shares traded is larger than CRSP daily share volume; and (v) the 
transactions which are duplicates. 
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During this period many technology firms had either no earnings or negative 
earnings. Hence, commonly used price to fundamental ratios (i.e., Price/Earnings) can 
not differentiate between a distressed old economy firm and a highly priced technology 
firm. I use the price-to-sale (P/S) ratio in order to identify technology stocks that are 
more likely to be overvalued. For each month during the 1998-2000 period, I compute 
P/S ratio using end-of-month market capitalization and sales figures that are lagged at 
least six months and. I sort NASDAQ stocks based on P/S ratio and form five portfolios 
based on P/S quintile breakpoints. I rebalance these portfolios every month. In Figure 
II.1, I graph the value weighted return indices of NASDAQ stocks in the highest, the 
middle and the lowest P/S quintile. 
Figure II.1 shows that the price index of NASDAQ stocks in the highest P/S 
quintile increased four times by March 2000 and about half of the gains were wiped out 
by the end of the same year. This trend is similar to those reported in studies which only 
focus on internet stocks (i.e., Ofek and Richardson (2003)). I refer to NASDAQ stocks 
in the highest P/S quintile as technology stocks. This parsimonious classification is also 
used in studies such as Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Dass, Massa and Patgiri 
(2008) which investigate hedge funds’ and mutual funds’ trading at technology stocks 
during this period. I follow this classification because it enables me to investigate insider 
trading activity in technology stocks (such as Sun Microsystems and EMC) which are 
not internet stocks but had high prices during this period. 
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Figure II.1: Return Index 
The NASDAQ stocks are grouped into five portfolios based on Price/Sales ratio at the end of each month from December 1997 to 
December 2002. Then value weighted monthly returns of each portfolio is compounded to compute return indices. The figure shows the 
value weighted return indices for (I) NASDAQ portfolios with highest Price/Sales ratio, (II) NASDAQ portfolios with Mid-level 
Price/Sales ratio, (III) NASDAQ portfolios with lowest Price/Sales ratio and (IV) NYSE/AMEX portfolio. 
 
  
14
II.2  Empirical Results 
 I report annual summary statistics on insider transactions for technology stocks, 
Other NASDAQ Stocks and NYSE/AMEX Stocks in Panel A of Table II.1. I subtract 
monthly insider sales from insider purchases in each stock to determine monthly net 
purchases. I annualize the monthly insider purchases, sales and net purchases at stock 
level and compute annual summary statistics for the period of 1998-2000.  
The first row summarizes the fraction of firms with at least one insider 
transaction. The fraction of technology stocks with insider sales is higher than the 
fraction of Other NASDAQ Stocks with insider sales. The second row shows that the 
average number of insider sales in technology stocks is higher than the average number 
of insider sales in Other NASDAQ Stocks. Moreover, the average number of insider 
purchases in technology stocks is lower than the average number of insider purchases in 
Other NASDAQ Stocks and NYSE/AMEX Stocks. I define the average percent share 
volume (average percent dollar volume) as the average of insider share (dollar) volume 
scaled by outstanding shares and report the statistics in row three (four). The last two 
rows document the total dollar volume and share volume (in millions). The statistics on 
insider sales and insider net purchases are similar; hence I omit interpretation of net 
purchases. Overall statistics suggest that the insider sales at technology stocks are larger 
than the insider sales at both Other NASDAQ stocks and NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
Table II.1, Panel B reports the number of technology stocks with a price peak in 
each quarter during 1999-2000. The table includes only the price peaks of the sub-
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sample of technology stocks that are investigated in the rest of the study.14 For each 
stock, I construct a monthly total return index from 1998 to 2000. I define the price peak 
as the calendar month end in which the total return index reached its highest level.  The 
technology stocks are comprised of NASDAQ stocks that were in the highest P/S 
quintile of NASDAQ at the time of their peak. I examine only stocks that peaked in 1999 
or 2000 since most technology stocks reached their highest valuations in these years. 
The NASDAQ index reached its highest level in March 2000, and not surprisingly the 
first quarter of 2000 has the most number of stock peaks. However, the table shows that 
some technology stocks peaked as early as in the first quarter of 1999 but some 
technology stocks peaked after the market peak.  
II.2.A  Insider Trading Around Individual Stock Price Peaks 
Seyhun (1988, 1992) document that aggregate insider trading activity predicts 
future market movements. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document a positive relation 
between aggregate insider trading and aggregate returns. An earlier study, Seyhun 
(1990) investigates insider trading around the market crash of 1987 and concludes that 
overreaction was an important part of crash. I conduct an event study to examine the 
insider trading activity around individual stock price peaks during the technology 
bubble. If insiders have superior information about their firms’ cash flows, then their 
aggregated trades should reflect their view about fundamentals. 
                                                 
14 Some Nasdaq stocks drops out of the sample because of data requirements in empirical analysis. I 
require stocks to exist at least twelve month in 1998 to construct their price indices. I further require stocks 
to have at least four years of data for the time series test in the next section. The frequency distribution of 
price peaks is similar when I consider all stocks that are classified as technology stock based on P/S 
quintiles.  
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Table II.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports annual summary statistics of insider transactions for High PS NASDAQ, Other NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks from January, 1998 
to December 2000. Purchases and sales include open market transactions of CEO/Chair, officers, executives and board of directors. Net purchases is 
computed as the difference between purchase and sale transactions at a firm. The monthly purchases, sales, and net purchases are annualized for each 
firm and then averaged across firms. Fraction refers to the average fraction of firms with at least one insider transaction. Number of trades is the average 
number of trades per company. Average percent share volume is the average of insider share volume scaled by outstanding shares. Average percent 
dollar volume is the average of insider dollar volume scaled by market capitalization. Total number of shares and total dollar volume are in millions. P-
values from Wilcoxon two-Sample test that use High P/S NASDAQ stocks as benchmark are reported in parenthesis. Panel B reports the number of 
price peaks in each quarter during 1999-2000. It includes only High P/S NASDAQ stocks that have 97 months of data. ***, **, and * denote significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics  
Purchases Sales Net Purchases Purchases Sales Net Purchases Purchases Sales Net Purchases
Fraction of Firms with Insider Transactions 0.48 0.74 0.88 0.55 0.59 * 0.81 * 0.61 0.69 0.87
(0.38) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19) (1.00)
Number of Trades 2.62 22.54 -22.67 3.62 8.20 * -5.71 * 3.59 * 13.02 -10.89
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.19)
Average Percent Share Volume 0.35% 1.40% -0.99% 0.54% * 1.10% * -0.44% * 0.16% * 0.53% * -0.31% *
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Average Percent Dollar Volume 0.34% 1.38% -1.19% 0.53% * 1.08% * -0.74% * 0.16% * 0.53% * -0.42% *
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Total Number of Shares (milions) 43.8 758.3 -714.5 99.6 410.7 -311.1 66.0 705.9 -639.8
Total Dollar Volume (millions) 510 50,899 -50,389 695 12,787 -12,092 1,424 35,851 -34,426
NYSE/AMEX
Median # of Firms: 915
High PS NASDAQ
Median # of Firms: 607
Other NASDAQ
Median # of Firms: 1,058
 
Panel B. Frequency of Stock Price Peaks  
Year Quarter Number of Peaks
1999 1 5
2 11
3 3
4 17
2000 1 91
2 24
3 68
4 34
Total 253
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I measure aggregate insider trading activity at technology stocks, Other 
NASDAQ Stocks and NYSE/AMEX Stocks using the Net Purchase Ratio (NPR).15 NPR 
is defined as the difference between the number of insider purchases and sales as 
fraction of total number of insider transactions.  
NPR= 
SalesPurchases
SalesPurchases
+
−        (1) 
I investigate the insider trading activity around individual stock price peaks in a 
spirit of event study. I align monthly insider transactions at each stock in event time 
(time zero equals the peak month). I aggregate insider transactions within in each three 
groups of stocks and calculate three different NPR series based on aggregated numbers. I 
run time series regressions of NPR for three groups of stocks separately. In the 
regressions, I include dummy variables for the peak month and up to four quarters 
(three-month peroids) before and after the peak. These dummy variables enable me to 
examine the abnormal insider trading activity around the peaks. I require stocks to have 
at least four years of data before and after their peaks to be included in calculation of 
NPR.16 NPR series is positively auto-correlated, hence I allow for first order 
autocorrelation in error term in time series tests. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Seyhun (1990) use purchase ratio while investigating insider trading around the market crash of 1987. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) make use of net purchase ratio to investigate the return predictability of 
insider trading. 
16 I repeat my tests requiring stocks to have only four years of data before their peaks. The results remain 
similar. See Section IV for more details. 
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           (2) 
 
 
 
where ttt vv εϕ += −1  with ),0( 2σε Nt  and ],[1)(, batiftI ba ∈=   
and otherwisetI ba 0)(, =   
Table II.2, Panel A reports the results for three NPR series The intercept terms 
show the average (mean) level of NPR for each series outside one year around the peaks. 
The coefficients of the quarter and the peak month dummy variables show the difference 
of NPR from its mean, hence measure abnormal insider trading activity in those periods.   
The NPR series can take values between minus one and plus one. It equals to 
minus (plus) one when all insider transactions are sales (purchases). The intercept is 
negative for the technology stocks (- 0.756), Other NASDAQ stocks (- 0.604) and 
NYSE/AMEX stocks (- 0.678) and this result confirms that insiders are on average 
sellers. For technology stocks, the NPR is around its lower limit (- 0.756 - 0.227= - 
0.983) in the peak month suggesting that almost all insider transactions in the peak 
month were sales. The coefficient of the quarter dummies (I-9,-7, I-6,-4, and I-3,-1) for the 
three quarters before the peak are negative and significant for the technology stocks. 
This shows that NPR for technology stocks in each quarter before the peak is lower than 
its mean. The coefficients of dummy variables for quarters after the peaks are not 
significant for the technology stocks. Finally, none of the coefficients of quarter dummy 
variables are significant for Other NASDAQ stocks and NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
t
t
vtItItItI
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=
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Table II.2: Time Series Regression of Monthly Insider Trading Activity around Stock Price Peaks  
Panel A reports the results for time series test of Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) for High PS NASDAQ portfolio, Other NASDAQ portfolio and 
NYSE/AMEX portfolio. NPR is defined as the ratio of net insider purchases (purchases - sales) over total insider transactions (purchases + sales). 
Purchases and Sales are first summed across the firms in each portfolio and NPR of each portfolio is computed using aggregated data.  Sample includes 
firms that have data for 97 months around their peak months. The indicator variable I(t)t equals one for period t relative to the peak month and equals 
zero otherwise (e.g., I0 equals one when insider trading activity belongs to the peak month, and it equals zero otherwise. I-3,-1 equals one when insider 
trading activity belongs to one, two and three months prior to the peak month, and it equals zero otherwise). The insider trading activity is based on 
number of transactions. Time series analysis is based on first on first order autoregressive error model. Panel B reports the estimates using series of 
insider purchases and sales separately. P values are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A. Net Purchase Ratio 
N Intercept I -12,-10 I -9,-7 I -6,-4 I -3,-1 I 0 I 1,3 I 4,6 I 7, 9 I 10, 12
High PS NASDAQ 253 -0.756 *** -0.054 -0.165 ** -0.142 * -0.185 *** -(0.23)** -0.103 -0.122 -0.048 -0.132
(0.00) (0.50) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.15) (0.57) (0.11)
Other NASDAQ 506 -0.604 *** 0.109 -0.042 0.078 0.009 -0.062 -0.011 -0.111 0.074 0.127
(0.00) (0.27) (0.72) (0.51) (0.94) (0.64) (0.93) (0.35) (0.52) (0.20)
NYSE/AMEX 586 -0.678 *** 0.090 0.023 -0.060 -0.135 -0.147 -0.043 -0.150 0.043 -0.026
(0.00) (0.34) (0.82) (0.57) (0.22) (0.23) (0.69) (0.16) (0.68) (0.78)
N
P
R
 
 
Panel B. Sales and Purchases 
N Intercept I -12,-10 I -9,-7 I -6,-4 I -3,-1 I 0 I 1,3 I 4,6 I 7, 9 I 10, 12
High PS NASDAQ 253 0.452 *** 0.208 0.296 ** 0.427 *** 0.568 *** 1.041 *** 0.242 0.143 -0.044 -0.031
(0.00) (0.15) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.33) (0.76) (0.83)
Other NASDAQ 506 0.600 *** -0.048 0.013 -0.009 0.015 0.626 *** -0.110 -0.049 -0.090 -0.087
(0.00) (0.74) (0.94) (0.96) (0.94) (0.00) (0.56) (0.79) (0.60) (0.54)
NYSE/AMEX 586 0.828 *** 0.009 0.252 0.190 0.205 (0.99) 0.161 0.227 -0.057 -0.032
(0.00) (0.97) (0.37) (0.51) (0.50) 0.003 *** (0.59) (0.44) (0.84) (0.90)
High PS NASDAQ 253 0.055 *** 0.003 -0.030 * -0.012 -0.029 -0.052 ** -0.001 -0.016 -0.013 -0.034 **
(0.00) (0.85) (0.10) (0.50) (0.11) (0.03) (0.95) (0.38) (0.46) (0.05)
Other NASDAQ 506 0.126 *** 0.052 ** 0.005 0.036 -0.001 -0.012 -0.019 -0.021 0.022 0.021
(0.00) (0.04) (0.84) (0.16) (0.95) (0.73) (0.46) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40)
NYSE/AMEX 586 0.130 *** 0.090 *** 0.102 *** -0.001 -0.052 -0.045 0.010 -0.014 0.034 -0.001
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.97) (0.16) (0.36) (0.78) (0.70) (0.35) (0.99)
S
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e
s
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These findings suggest that there were abnormal insider trading activity at technology 
stocks in the ten months before their peak month; and this abnormal activity is not 
observed in other stocks that peaked in the same period.   
NPR captures both the number of insider sales and purchases and the abnormal 
levels of NPR may be due to large number of insider sales or low number of insider 
purchases during the pre-peak period. I repeat my tests using number of insider sales and 
purchases (in millions) as a measure of insider trading activity. I report the results in 
Panel B of Table II.2. For technology stocks, the total number of sale transactions is 
significantly higher than its mean in each of the three quarters before the peak and in the 
peak month. The total number of purchases in technology stocks was significantly low 
only in the third quarter prior to the peak month and in the peak month. These findings 
show that insiders in technology stocks not only increased their sales starting three 
quarters prior to peaks but also decreased their purchased less in the third quarter prior to 
the peaks. 
Figure II.1 shows that price index of technology stocks doubled in the ten months 
prior to the NASDAQ market peak in March, 2000.  Further investigation (not reported) 
shows that the technology stocks in the sample had 199.57% return (value weighted) 
during the ten months prior to the peaks. Other NASDAQ stocks and NYSE/AMEX 
stocks had 130% and 68% returns during their pre-peak period. The findings in this part 
suggest that tech-insiders sold their shares heavily during the steep price run-up prior to 
the peaks.  
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II.2.B  Cross Sectional Tests 
Jenter (2005) and Marin and Oliver (2007) suggest that insider sales contain 
information. Meulbroek (2000) argues that insiders of internet firms have an incentive to 
sell their share holdings because of high volatility of these stocks.17 The abnormal tech-
insider sales reported in the previous section may be based on information. 
Alternatively, insider sales may be driven by their portfolio rebalancing needs that are 
exacerbated by rising prices and high volatilities. In this section, I try to disentangle 
these two alternatives by making use of cross-sectional analysis.  
II.2.B.1  Demeaned and Scaled Net Insider Purchases 
The net purchase ratio, that is utilized to investigate aggregate insider trading 
activity in time series, is a poor measure of insider activity at stock level. When insiders 
of a firm do not trade in a month the NPR is undefined.18 More importantly, at stock 
level the NPR does not capture the magnitude of abnormal insider trading activity. 
Different insiders of a firm generally trade in the same direction and NPR practically 
shows only the direction of insider trading activity at stock level. In order to facilitate 
cross sectional analysis, I use net share purchases as a fraction of firms’ outstanding 
shares (NSP).  
gOutstandin Shares 
Sales - Purchases  NSP =         (3) 
                                                 
17 Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) document that the equity compensation in high technology firms 
substantially exceeds the equity compensation in large, “old-economy” manufacturing firms. 
18 To overcome this problem, Seyhun (1990) groups stocks into 100 portfolios based on size and beta. 
Alternatively, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) aggregate prior six months insider trading activity at stock 
level.  
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Insiders receive their firms’ stock through their compensation package and they 
are expected to sell their shares sometime regardless of price levels. In fact, some firms 
announce the amount of shares that insiders plan to sell ahead of time. In order to 
capture abnormal insider trading activity which is likely to be informative, I demean net 
share purchases using its time series mean ( NSP∆ ).   
NSPNSPNSP −=∆    where NSP  is time series mean of NSP   (4) 
To alleviate look-ahead bias, I compute the mean of scaled net share purchases 
using data until the beginning of the calendar year of the observation. I require stocks to 
exist at least twelve months before the observation month and to have at least one month 
in which net share purchases is different from zero. I refer to this demeaned and scaled 
net shares purchases ( NSP∆ ) as abnormal net insider trading in the rest of the study.  
II.2.B.2  Insider Trading Activity Controlling for Portfolio Rebalancing Needs 
In this section, I run cross sectional regressions of abnormal insider trading 
activity on proxy variables for insiders’ portfolio rebalancing needs. I pool monthly 
abnormal insider trading ( NSP∆ ) of all stocks during the twelve months before and after 
their peaks. I create dummy variables and their interactions for the technology stocks, 
the peak month and the pre-peak period. Insiders are likely to sell more shares when 
their firms’ stock has higher risk. I control for the effects of risk on insiders trading 
incentives by volatility.19 The insiders are likely to sell more shares as prices go up. I 
control for the effects of rising prices on insider trading motives, I include the 
cumulative returns from January 1998 until the observation month (price run-up). I 
                                                 
19 I define volatility as the standard deviation of daily returns in the previous month. 
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control for firm size (log of market capitalization), which previous studies have shown to 
effect the insider trading. Finally, I include lagged value of the abnormal insider trading 
activity to control for autocorrelations.  
 
 
 
Table II.3: Cross Sectional Regressions of Abnormal Insider Trading Activity 
This table reports the results from cross sectional tests of abnormal insider trading activity around stock 
price peaks. Net Share Purchases (NSP) is defined as purchases minus sales and it is scaled by shares 
outstanding. NSP is demeaned using its time series mean ( NSP∆ ). The NSP∆ of High P/S NASDAQ 
stocks, Other NASDAQ stocks, and NYSE/AMEX stocks in the twelve months before and after the peaks 
are pooled together for cross sectional test. Peak is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation 
belongs to the peak month and zero otherwise. Pre-Peak is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
monthly observation belongs to one to twelve months prior to the peak month and zero otherwise. High 
P/S NASDAQ is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm was at the highest P/S quintile of NASDAQ 
when it peaked and zero otherwise. Price Run-up is the compounded returns from January, 1998 to the 
observation month. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily prices in the month prior to the observation 
month. Size is defined as logarithm of market capitalization and lagged one month. Lagged value of 
NSP∆  is included to control for autocorrelations. P-values based on robust standard errors which are 
corrected for clustering are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High PS NASDAQ x Pre-Peak -0.0564*** -0.0625*** -0.0588*** -0.0638***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre-Peak Dummy 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.0022
(0.76) (0.79) (0.96) (0.69)
High PS NASDAQ  0.0220*** 0.0375*** 0.0315*** 0.0435***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Peak -0.0682*** -0.0676*** -0.0682*** -0.0677***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
High PS NASDAQ x Peak -0.0578** -0.0511* -0.0587** -0.0524*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Price Run-up -0.0072*** -0.0066***
(0.00) (0.00)
Volatility -0.4370*** -0.3321***
(0.00) (0.01)
Size -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0024* -0.0010
(0.71) (0.65) (0.06) (0.47)
Lagged ∆ NSP 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.0032 0.0027 0.0324*** 0.0250**
(0.73) (0.77) (0.01) (0.04)
Number of Observations 33,316 33,316 33,316 33,316
Adjusted R-squared 5.80% 8.20% 6.20% 8.70%  
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Table II.3 reports the results.20 Column 1 reports the regression results without 
controlling for portfolio rebalancing needs. Colum 2 and Column 3 report the results 
from regressions which control for price run-up and volatility, respectively. Colum 4 
reports the result controlling for both price run-up and volatility. The main results from 
each specification are similar, so I interpret the results from the full model in Column 4. 
Note that the inclusion of dummy variables for technology stocks, pre-peak period, and 
peak month leaves the post peak period of NYSE/AMEX stocks and Other NASDAQ 
stocks as control. The coefficient of the interaction variable for technology stocks (High 
PS NASDAQ stocks) and the pre-peak period is significant and negative (-0.064). The 
coefficient of dummy variable for technology stocks is positive and significant (0.044). 
The sum of these two coefficients is -0.020 and it shows that abnormal tech-insider sales 
in the pre-peak period were large even after controlling for price run-up and volatility. 
The coefficient of the peak month dummy variable and coefficient of its interaction with 
dummy variable for technology stocks is also negative. These show that abnormal tech-
insider sales in the peak month were large after controlling for price run-up and 
volatility. And finally, the coefficients for price run-up and volatility are negative, as 
expected.  
The results in this section show that controlling for the insiders’ portfolio 
rebalancing needs, the abnormal insider sales at technology stocks were large prior to the 
peaks. In the next section, I further investigate whether these sales contained information 
                                                 
20 I repeat the tests using abnormal insider trading based on overall time series mean of net share 
purchases. The results remain similar.  
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by examining the relation between the abnormal insider trading activity and the 
subsequent returns for technology stocks.   
II.2.B.3  Insider Trading Activity and Post-Peak Returns 
If insider trading activity in the pre-peak period is only driven by portfolio 
rebalancing needs (a naïve contrarian strategy), then there should be no relation between 
insider trading before the peaks and price declines after the peaks. If insider trading 
contains information, then abnormal insider trading activity in the pre-peak period 
should predict price declines in the post peak period. 
Figure II.1 shows that the return index of technology stocks lost half of its value 
in the nine months following the market peak in March, 2000. I compound the returns of 
stocks in the nine months after the peak (post-peak returns) in order to measure decline 
in prices 21. I measure abnormal insider trading activity by demeaned and scaled net 
share purchases ( NSP∆ ) as described in section III.B.1. I cumulate monthly NSP∆ of 
each stock from nine months prior to the peak month to the peak month (event window 
[-9, 0], ten months) and refer to it as total abnormal insider trading activity 
(Total NSP∆ ). I run regressions of post peak returns on total abnormal insider trading 
and price run-up, volatility and firm size that computed for the peak month for High P/S 
NASDAQ stocks, Other NASDAQ stocks and NYSE/AMEX stocks. Also, I pool the 
total abnormal insider trading and post peak returns of stocks in each group and run the 
regressions on overall sample. In this regression, I include a dummy variable for 
                                                 
21 I also investigate compounded returns in 3, 6, 12 and 24 months after the peak. The results are similar.   
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technology stocks (High PS NASDAQ) and its interaction with total abnormal insider 
trading activity.  
 
 
 
Table II.4: Insider Trading Activity and Post-Peak Returns 
This table reports the relation between post-peak returns and total abnormal insider trading activity in 
the pre-peak period. Post-peak returns are the compounded returns in nine months after the peaks. 
Abnormal insider trading activity is measured by demeaned net share purchases NSP∆  as defined in 
Table 3.  Total NSP∆ is the sum of monthly NSP∆ in ten months prior to the price peaks and in the 
peak month. High P/S NASDAQ is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm was at the highest P/S 
quintile of NASDAQ when it peaked and zero otherwise. Price Run-up is the compounded returns 
from January, 1998 to the peak month. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily prices in the month 
prior to the peak month. Size is defined as logarithm of market capitalization in the peak month. P-
values based on robust standard errors which are corrected for clustering are in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
High PS 
NASDAQ
Other 
NASDAQ NYSE/AMEX All
Total ∆ NSP 1.5963** 1.0096 1.2511** 1.0485***
(0.02) (0.54) (0.02) (0.00)
High PS NASDAQ X Total ∆ NSP 1.9113***
(0.00)
High PS NASDAQ -0.1003***
(0.00)
Volatility -2.9476*** -4.0288*** -4.7053*** -4.2480***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Price Run-up -0.0068*** -0.0210*** -0.0131* -0.0127***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00)
Size -0.0101 -0.0158* -0.0077 -0.0068*
(0.30) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
Constant -0.2462** -0.0305 -0.0304 -0.0628**
(0.01) (0.64) (0.55) (0.07)
Number of Observations 253 506 586 1,345
Adjusted R-squared 12.00% 13.00% 16.00% 20.00%  
 
 
 
Table II.4 reports the results. Note that Total NSP∆  for the ten months before the 
peaks (pre-peak period) is negative since insiders were heavy sellers in the pre-peak 
period. The post-peak returns are negative as prices declined after the peak. The first 
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column shows that the total abnormal insider trading activity (Total ( NSP∆ )) in 
technology stocks is positively related to the post peak returns. In the second column, the 
coefficient of Total NSP∆  is positive but insignificant. Hence, total insider trading 
activity is not related to post-peak returns of Other NASDAQ stocks. The third column 
shows that total abnormal trading activity in NYSE/AMEX stocks is also related post-
peak returns. In column 4, the coefficient for the High PS NASDAQ indicator variable is 
negative and significant; hence total insider trading in technology stocks was more 
negative than those in other stocks. Also, the interaction of High PS NASDAQ dummy 
variable and total insider trading activity is positive and significant, which suggests that 
tech-insider trading in the pre-peak period contained information. In all tests volatility is 
negatively related to the post peak returns. This shows that the prices of riskier stocks 
dropped more in the post peak period. Price run up is also negatively related to the post-
peak returns. The stocks with large increases in their valuations in the previous two years 
had larger price declines in the post peak period.  
Table II.4 suggests that technology stocks that were sold more extensively by 
insiders in the pre-peak period had larger price declines in the post peak period. Hence, 
the abnormal insider activity in the pre-peak period was not only insiders’ response to 
rising prices.  
The results in Table II.2 show that there were large insider sales in the peak 
month and technology insiders were heavy sellers during the nine months prior to the 
peaks. The relation between the total abnormal insider trading and the post peak returns 
may be largely driven by the abnormal sales in the peak month. On the other hand, the 
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abnormal tech-insider trading activity many months before the peaks may predict the 
post peak returns. I further investigate the abnormal tech-insider trading activity many 
months before the peaks and post peak returns. More specifically, I run separate 
regressions using Total NSP∆  that is calculated by dropping abnormal tech-insider 
trading for the month closest to the peak month one at a time.  
Table II.5 reports the results from regressions that include Total NSP∆  for 
various pre-peak event windows in Columns 2 to Column 10. The other variables in the 
regression are measured at the time of the peak month as in Column 1. The coefficients 
of Total NSP∆ for various event windows show that the abnormal insider sales as early 
as nine months before the peaks are positively related to price declines; hence contained 
information.22  
II.2.C  Net Order Flow and Insider Trading  
The order flow may be a signal of private information and cause market makers 
to update their price and quantity quotations. Hence, order flow can reduce liquidity and 
move prices permanently consistent with information asymmetry models (Kyle (1985), 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley and O’Hara (1987)). Inventory models (Stoll 
(1978), Ho and Stoll (1983) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1995)) imply that market 
makers revise their bid-ask spreads when they face inventory problems caused by order 
flows. Consistent with theory, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chordia, 
                                                 
22 In the table Total NSP∆ of [-9, -4] is insignificant but positive. Unreported results show that the 
monthly abnormal insider trading activity ( NSP∆ ) in the nine, seven , three, and one month before the 
peak months are positively related to post peak returns.   
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Table II.5: Tech Insider Trading Activity and Post-Peak Returns 
 
This table reports the relation between post-peak returns and total abnormal insider trading activity in the pre-peak period. Post-peak returns are the 
compounded returns in nine months after the peaks. Abnormal insider trading activity is measured by demeaned net share purchases NSP∆  as defined 
in Table 3.  Total NSP∆ is the sum of monthly NSP∆ in the event window. The event window shows event months over which the total NSP∆ is 
calculated. All windows start in the ninth month before the peak month. The first window end in the peak month (t=0) and from left to right the 
windows drop one event month closest to the peak month. (i.e., [-9,0] includes all months in the pre-peak period and [-9,-9] window includes only the 
ninth month before the peak). The sample includes only High P/S NASDAQ stocks. Price Run-up is the compounded returns from January, 1998 to the 
peak month. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily prices in the month prior to the peak month.  Size is defined as logarithm of market 
capitalization in the peak month. P-values based on robust standard errors which are corrected for clustering are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Window [-9,0] [-9,-1] [-9,-2] [-9,-3] [-9,-4] [-9,-5] [-9,-6] [-9,-7] [-9,-8] [-9,-9]
Total ∆ NSP 1.596 1.406 1.194 1.938 1.011 2.568 3.063 3.196 4.049 5.264
(0.02)** (0.04)** (0.07)* (0.01)** -0.25 (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.02)** (0.00)***
Volatility -2.948 -2.981 -2.991 -2.973 -2.962 -2.985 -2.989 -3.003 -2.986 -2.935
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Price Run-up -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Size -0.01 -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.30) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.33) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37)
Constant -0.246 -0.25 -0.253 -0.255 -0.259 -0.252 -0.255 -0.256 -0.258 -0.26
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Number of Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253
Adjusted R-squared 12.00% 12.00% 11.00% 12.00% 11.00% 12.00% 12.00% 12.00% 11.00% 11.00%  
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and Subrahmanyam (2004) show that net order flow is positively related to stock returns.  
Lin and Rozeff (1995) suggest that 85% to 88 % of insiders’ private information 
is incorporated into prices within one day. Earlier studies (Givoly and Palmon (1985), 
Meulbroek (1992), Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chakvarty and McConnell (1997)) 
suggest that insider trading facilitates rapid price discovery on insider trading days. 
Consistent with microstructure theories, the abnormal insider trading activity may be a 
signal of private information. When insiders trade excessively, other market participants 
may realize existence of an informed trader and insiders’ information will be 
incorporated to the prices. To the extent other market participants follow the insiders 
there will be net order flow in the same direction of insider trading activity.   
I investigate the relation between the net order flows and abnormal insider 
trading activity at 1,345 stocks from January, 1996 to August, 2002. I classify intraday 
trades using Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm as buyer initiated or seller initiated trades. 
In this algorithm, if a trade is executed at a price higher (lower) than the prevailing quote 
midpoint then it is classified as a buyer (seller) initiated trade. If a trade is executed at 
the quote midpoint then it is classified as buyer (seller) initiated trade based on the 
previous transaction price (i.e., if the transaction price is higher (lower) than previous 
transaction price then it is buyer (seller) initiated trade). I calculate weekly net order 
flows ( tiOIBSHR , ) as the difference between share volume of buyer initiated and seller 
initiated transactions as a fraction of total share volume in a week. I measure abnormal 
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net insider trading ( tiNSP ,∆ ) as described in section III.B.1, but I use insider 
transactions at weekly level rather then monthly level.23 
I run firm-fixed-effects regressions of weekly net order flow on abnormal insider 
trading activity, the contemporaneous returns, and the lagged values of the net order 
flows and the returns up-to four weeks. In order to investigate the relation between net 
order flows and abnormal insider trading activity during the pre-peak period, I include a 
dummy variable for the pre-peak period and its interaction with the contemporaneous 
abnormal insider trading. Specifically, I estimate the following regression equation using 
separate data panels for High P/S NASDAQ stocks, Other NASDAQ stocks and 
NYSE/AMEX stocks.  
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with tiitiu ,, εµ += where i=1,..,number of stocks  and t=1..340 
The contemporaneous returns ( tiRET , ), lagged returns ( ktiRET −, ) and lagged net 
order flow ( ktiOIBSHR −, ) is included in the regressions as previous studies (i.e.,  
Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)) show that the net order flow is positively related to 
the contemporaneous returns and the net order flow is positively auto-correlated.  
                                                 
23 Insider trading activity is quite infrequent at daily level. In order to eliminate biases created by large 
number of non-insider trading days, I run the tests at weekly level. The tests using daily abnormal insider 
trading and daily net order flows yield economically similar results.   
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Table II.6, Panel A reports the correlation structure for the main variables. The 
net order flow and abnormal insider trading are positively correlated. While the 
correlation coefficient is low, it is statistically significant. The abnormal insider trading 
is negatively correlated with the contemporaneous returns. The abnormal insider trading 
and lagged abnormal insider trading are highly correlated.  
Table II.6, Panel B reports the results from firm-fixed-effects regressions in 
equation 5. The net order flow is positively related to the abnormal insider trading 
activity. The pre-peak dummy variable is positive but only significant for technology 
stocks. This shows that there were more buyer (or less seller) initiated trades at 
technology stocks during the pre-peak period. The interaction of pre-peak dummy 
variable and abnormal insider trading activity is negative. These results suggest the 
positive relation between net order flows and abnormal insider trading was weaker 
during the pre-peak period.  
II.3  Robustness Tests 
I document that that tech-insiders were heavy sellers during ten months prior to 
the price peaks. In this section, I provide additional tests to show that the results are not 
driven by sample selection or variable definitions.  
In time series regression, I require sample stocks to exist four years before and 
after the peaks. Especially, the requirement of four years of data after the peaks may 
introduce a survivorship bias as many technology firms failed after 2000. I repeat my 
time series tests requiring stocks to have only four years of data before the peaks. I 
report the results in Table II.7, Panel A. Similar to the results in Panel A of Table II.2, I
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Table II.6: Net Order Flow and Abnormal Insider Trading Activity  
Panel A reports the correlation matrix for the main variables. Panel B reports the results from firm-fixed-effects regressions of weekly net order flow on 
weekly abnormal insider trading, contemporaneous returns, lagged abnormal insider trading, returns, and net order flows. The sample includes weekly 
trading activity of 1,345 firms from January 1996 to August, 2002. The regressions are run on three separate panels for High P/S NASDAQ stocks, 
Other NASDAQ stocks and NYSE/AMEX stocks. The intraday transactions are classified as buyer or seller initiated transactions using Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm. Net order flow, OIBSHR, is defined in terms of share volume (buyer initiated transactions minus seller initiated transactions scaled by 
total transactions).  Abnormal insider trading, NSP∆ , is defined as the difference between net number of share purchases (purchases minus sales as a 
fraction of shares outstanding) and its historical time series mean. Pre-peak is a dummy variable that equals one if observation belongs to the weeks in 
the ten months prior to the price peaks and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix 
High PS 
NASDAQ
Other 
NASDAQ NYSE/AMEX
OIBSHR t OIBSHR t-1 ∆NSP ∆NSP t-1 RET t OIBSHR t OIBSHR t-1 ∆NSP ∆NSP t-1 RET t OIBSHR t OIBSHR t-1 ∆NSP ∆NSP t-1 RET t
OIBSHR t 1.00 1.00 1.00
OIBSHR t-1 0.20 1.00 0.19 1.00 0.30 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆NSP 0.01 -0.03 1.00 0.01 -0.03 1.00 0.02 -0.02 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆NSP t-1 0.01 0.01 0.24 1.00 -0.00 0.01 0.19 1.00 -0.00 0.02 0.18 1.00
(0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
RET t 0.34 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 1.00 0.34 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 1.00 0.28 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.75)
RET t-1 0.05 0.34 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.34 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.28 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
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Table II.6 Continued 
 
Panel B: Net Order Flow and Abnormal Insider Trading Activity 
High PS 
NASDAQ
Other 
NASDAQ NYSE/AMEX
∆NSP 0.2474*** 0.2109*** 0.2795***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∆NSP X Pre-Peak -0.2385*** -0.4317*** -0.2384***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pre-Peak 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0000
(0.00) (0.42) (0.23)
∆NSP t-1 0.0114 -0.0243 -0.0510***
(0.60) (0.11) (0.00)
∆NSP t-2 -0.0221 0.0200 -0.0203*
(0.31) (0.19) (0.09)
∆NSP t-3 -0.0834*** -0.0273* -0.0386***
(0.00) (0.07) (0.00)
∆NSP t-4 0.0380* 0.0688*** 0.0120
(0.08) (0.00) (0.31)
OIBSHR t-1 0.1508*** 0.1613*** 0.1903***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OIBSHR t-2 0.0832*** 0.0307*** 0.1013***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OIBSHR t-3 0.0606*** 0.0264*** 0.0855***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OIBSHR t-4 0.0465*** 0.0103*** 0.0761***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
RET t 0.0283*** 0.0320*** 0.0199***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
RET t-1 0.0004 0.0024*** 0.0005***
(0.16) (0.00) (0.00)
RET t-2 -0.0023*** -0.0007*** -0.0014***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
RET t-3 -0.0020*** 0.0006*** -0.0015***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
RET t-4 -0.0015*** -0.0000 -0.0016***
(0.00) (0.99) (0.00)
Constant -0.0001*** -0.0008*** 0.0005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of Firm-Weeks 82,137 157,982 192,776
Number of Firms 253 504 582
R-squared 16.00% 15.00% 17.00%  
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find that the Net Purchase Ratio for technology stock was significantly lower in the nine 
months prior to the peaks and in the peak month.  
 The previous studies on insider trading literature utilize net purchase ratio based 
on both number of transactions and number of shares. The ratios calculated based on the 
number of shares are noisier and most studies have significance when these ratios are 
computed based on the number of insider transactions (i.e., Seyhun (1992), Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001)). I also repeat the investigation of Net Purchase Ratio around the price 
peaks using Net Purchase Ratio series based on number of shares insiders traded. The 
results in Panel B of Table II.7 show that Net Purchase Ratio based on number of shares 
was lower in the three quarter and one quarter before the price peaks of technology 
stocks. The Net Purchase Ratio based on number of shares is also significantly lower in 
the first quarter after the peaks. Further investigation shows that the tech-stock insiders 
sold large number of shares at firms that peaked earlier than the market peak in March 
2000. Hence, insiders of these technology stocks were able to sell large number shares 
before the stock prices started to fall.  
 In this essay, I investigate the insider trading activity during the special bubble 
period. To highlight uniqueness of insider trading activity at technology firms during this 
period, I further investigate insider trading activity around stocks peaks in 1996 and 
1997. I re-calculate the price indices for individual stocks starting from January, 1995. 
Then, I classify the stocks into three groups based on P/S quintiles and investigate the 
Net Purchase Ratio around the price peaks during 1996 and 1997. I report the results in 
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Panel C of Table II.7. The results show that Net Purchase Ratio was not different from 
its mean around the peaks during 1996 and 1997. 
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Table II.7: Robustness Tests 
This table reports robustness tests for time series analysis of Net Purchase Ratio (NPR). Panel A, utilize NPR series computed on a sample that only 
requires sample firms to exist in forty eight months prior to their peaks. N* denotes median number of stocks in each portfolio. Panel B, utilize NPR 
series computed based on insider share volume. Panel C, investigates NPR series (based on number of transactions) around the price peaks in 1996 and 
1997. All other definitions are similar to Table 2. ***, **, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: NPR Series for Large Sample  
N* Intercept I -12,-10 I -9,-7 I -6,-4 I -3,-1 I 0 I 1,3 I 4,6 I 7, 9 I 10, 12
High PS NASDAQ 344 -0.757 *** -0.032 -0.148 * -0.141 * -0.184 ** -0.227 ** -0.102 -0.141 -0.111 -0.144
(0.00) (0.69) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.27) (0.12) (0.21) (0.14)
Other NASDAQ 701 -0.622 *** 0.058 -0.071 0.064 0.008 -0.101 0.021 -0.048 0.065 0.101
(0.00) (0.57) (0.58) (0.65) (0.96) (0.54) (0.89) (0.73) (0.61) (0.32)
NYSE/AMEX 623 -0.681 *** 0.135 -0.010 -0.074 -0.105 -0.108 0.009 -0.061 0.040 -0.017
(0.00) (0.22) (0.93) (0.57) (0.44) (0.47) (0.95) (0.64) (0.75) (0.88)
N
P
R
 
Panel B: NPR Series Computed Based on Number of Shares  
N Intercept I -12,-10 I -9,-7 I -6,-4 I -3,-1 I 0 I 1,3 I 4,6 I 7, 9 I 10, 12
High PS NASDAQ 253 -0.893 *** -0.018 -0.087 * -0.067 -0.083 * -0.098 -0.086 * -0.063 -0.074 -0.060
(0.00) (0.71) (0.07) (0.16) (0.09) (0.19) (0.07) (0.19) (0.12) (0.21)
Other NASDAQ 506 -0.805 *** 0.147 * -0.130 -0.034 -0.054 -0.118 -0.066 -0.022 -0.038 0.008
(0.00) (0.06) (0.11) (0.67) (0.50) (0.27) (0.42) (0.79) (0.63) (0.92)
NYSE/AMEX 586 -0.845 *** 0.085 -0.035 -0.101 -0.135 * -0.139 -0.081 -0.086 0.025 -0.081
(0.00) (0.24) (0.63) (0.17) (0.07) (0.20) (0.27) (0.24) (0.73) (0.26)
N
P
R
 
Panel C: NPR Series around the Price Peaks in 1996 and 1997  
N Intercept I -12,-10 I -9,-7 I -6,-4 I -3,-1 I 0 I 1,3 I 4,6 I 7, 9 I 10, 12
High PS NASDAQ 199 -0.810 *** 0.082 -0.070 -0.105 -0.114 -0.135 -0.072 -0.005 0.043 0.140
(0.00) (0.41) (0.48) (0.29) (0.25) (0.30) (0.46) (0.96) (0.66) (0.12)
Other NASDAQ 733 -0.478 *** -0.007 0.013 0.000 -0.212 -0.264 -0.223 -0.098 -0.074 -0.106
(0.00) (0.97) (0.94) (1.00) (0.20) (0.13) (0.16) (0.52) (0.59) (0.35)
NYSE/AMEX 879 -0.708 *** 0.155 0.134 0.039 -0.035 -0.093 -0.048 -0.077 -0.004 0.017
(0.00) (0.25) (0.31) (0.76) (0.78) (0.45) (0.67) (0.46) (0.96) (0.81)
N
P
R
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CHAPTER III 
INSIDER TRADING AND EARNINGS SURPRISES: THE CASE OF 
EXPEDITED DISCLOSURE OF INSIDER TRANSACTIONS 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section III.1 summarizes the insider 
disclosure requirements that are changed by Sarbanes Oxley Act. Section III.2 describes 
the data and the methodology. Section III.3 discusses the empirical results.  
III.1   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Insider Disclosure Requirements 
Prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent changes in the SEC 
rules, insiders had to report open market transactions to the SEC by the tenth day of the 
next month (Form 4 filing). However, certain types of insider transactions could be 
reported any time within 45 days after the end of the fiscal year (Form 5 filing).  
The congress started to discuss Sarbanes–Oxley Act in early 2002 and the SEC 
substantially tightened the rules on reporting of insider transactions on August 27, 2002. 
Below, I briefly describe the changes on reporting requirements of insider transactions.24 
• Form 4 has to be filed electronically on EDGAR within 2 days (The insider has 
an additional day if trade execution is difficult,).  
• The small acquisitions (insider purchases of $10,000 or less) and transactions 
between the firm and the insider (Rule 16b-3) have to be reported on Form 4 
rather then Form 5 that is reported after fiscal year end.   
                                                 
24 The full list of changes is available at www.sec.gov  
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Recent empirical studies investigate the Act’s presumptions and its affects on 
issues related Form-5 filing. Cheng, Nagar and Rajan (2007) show that insiders used 
Form-5 opportunistically to hide their transactions until after the fiscal year end. Prior to 
the Act, the option grants to executives were reported in Form-5 filing after the fiscal 
year end which raised option backdating issues. Recent studies (i.e., Heron and Lie 
(2007) Collins, Gong and Li (2005), Narayanan and Seyhun (2005)) show a sharp 
decline of option grants that appears to be backdated after the Act. In contrast to these 
studies, I focus on expedited disclosure of insider open market transactions that were 
already being reported in Form 4 filings. Specifically, I examine the affect of insider 
trading disclosure within two business days rather than forty calendar days.   
III.2   Data and Methodology 
III.2.A  Sample Selection 
The sample is comprised of 10,395 quarterly earnings announcements by 432 
firms over two four-year periods (January 1996 to December 1999 and January 2003 to 
December 2006)25. The data comes from four different sources. I use (i) Thomson 
Financial Network (TFN) for insider trading data; (ii) Center for Research in Security 
prices (CRSP) for stock returns; (iii)  CRSP/Compustat merged database for accounting 
data; (iv) Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) for earnings forecasts. I merge 
the data using CUSIP numbers and examine firms that exist in all four databases.  
                                                 
25 Sarbanes-Oxley act was preceded by the Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading Regulation Act 
known as Fair Disclosure (FD) which went into effect in October 2000. Given that it is difficult to 
attribute changes on insider trading behavior to FD or expectations of stricter regulation during the 
transitory period, I exclude 2000-2002 from my sample period.  
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I further require that (i) quarterly announcement dates are available from 
Compustat; (ii) price, trading volume and return data are available from CRSP; (iii) the 
firms’ common stock is trading either at New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or at the 
American Stock exchange (AMEX) (iv) the firms’ fiscal year-end date is December 31st;  
(v) the stock price by the end of quarter is larger than $5; and (vi) each firm has to have 
at least one earnings announcement before and after the Act. I require the first two 
criterions to have usable data for the analysis. The third criterion is required to refrain 
from the effects of technology bubble. The purpose of the fourth criterion is to align the 
quarterly dates accurately. The fifth criterion is required to eliminate microstructure 
biases on returns and biases related to firms that are likely to be in financial distress. The 
last criterion is required to have a comparable sample across two periods. 
III.2.B  Insider Trading Measures 
I follow Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and filter insider trading data to avoid 
inconsistencies between TFN and CRSP.26 I investigate only open-market transactions 
by top management (CEOs, chairman of board, CFOs, directors, officers, and 
executives). 
I define the pre-announcement window to be the month before the earnings 
announcement ([t- 32, t - 2], where t = earnings announcement date), because IBES 
forecasts generally precede the earnings announcement by one month. To facilitate 
                                                 
26 Due to erroneous reporting of insider transactions, I delete the following insider transactions: (i) the 
transactions with missing prices and number of shares; (ii)the transactions with price which is not within 
twenty percent range of daily CRSP price; (iii) the transactions in which  number of shares an insider 
trades is  larger than twenty percent of firms’ outstanding shares; (iv) the transactions less than 100 shares; 
(iv) the transactions in which number of shares traded is larger than CRSP daily share volume; and (v) the 
transactions which are duplicates. 
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comparability of insider trading measures between the pre and post-announcement 
windows, I measure post-announcement trading over an equal sized window of the 
month following the earnings announcement ([t + 2, t + 32]). Finally, approximately 
thirty days between the pre-announcement window and the prior quarter's post-
announcement window is defined as the benchmark window. Some level of trading by 
insiders occurs normally hence insider trading during this period might be considered as 
'benchmark' trading. These definitions of pre, post and benchmark periods have been 
previously used in Garfinkel (1997) which investigates the effects of increased threat of 
legal sanction on insider trading.27  
I measure net insider trading activity during pre-announcement, post-
announcement and benchmark periods by using Net Purchase Ratio (NPR). The NPR is 
defined as the difference between the number of shares purchased by insiders and the 
number of shares sold by insiders as a fraction of the total number of shares transacted 
by insiders in a period. Specifically: 
NPR= 
SalesPurchases
SalesPurchases
+
−        (6) 
The NPR varies between -1 and +1 hence it does not suffer from large firm 
biases that would skew unscaled measures of net insider trading activity.28 
                                                 
27 I also classified two months prior to upcoming earnings announcement and one month after the earnings 
announcement as pre and post announcement windows. I also divided approximately 90 days between 
earnings announcements equally as pre and post earnings announcement windows. The results are similar 
when alternative definitions of pre and post windows are used.  
28 NPR has been used in many previous insider trading studies such as Seyhun(1990), Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001). 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act may affect insider purchase and sale transactions 
differently. Hence, the results for insider purchases and insider sales are reported 
separately though out the paper. In multivariate analysis, I also scale insider share 
purchases and sales by firms’ outstanding shares to mitigate large firm biases.    
III.2.C  Earnings Surprises and Other Variables  
I define the earnings surprise as the actual earnings minus the median analyst 
earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the earnings quarter (Surprise). 
I measure the price reaction to earnings surprises (or the news in the earnings surprise) 
by the cumulative abnormal return for the three day window (-1, +1) centered on the 
earnings announcement days (CAR). I compute the CAR by subtracting the average 
return on a same size-book-to-market Fama and French portfolio (six portfolios) from 
the raw return. I winsorize the Surprise at 5 and 95 percentiles to alleviate the effects of 
extreme outliers. 
In the multivariate analysis, I control for various factors that may affect insider 
trading. Prior literature suggests that (i.e., Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Seyhun 
(1986)) insider trading may be driven by past returns (contrarian strategy) or may be 
driven by insiders’ information (not limited to upcoming earnings announcement). To 
control for these, I include the size deciles adjusted buy and hold returns from six 
months prior to earnings announcement to two days prior to earnings announcement 
(PreRet6) and similarly, the size deciles adjusted buy and hold returns from two days 
after earnings announcement to six months after the earnings announcement (PostRet6). 
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) show that insider sales are larger at glamour firms. I include 
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B/M (the book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity). Also, insiders at 
research and development intensive firms have a large information advantage. To 
control for this effect, I include research and development expense scaled by sales 
(R&D). The insider trading has been shown to be different at small and large firms. I 
control for firm size with market value of equity at the end of previous quarter. Also, 
insiders are likely to trade more when they can hide their trades. To control for this 
liquidity effects, I include the standard deviation of daily share turnover (StdVol) 
between two earnings announcements. I measure the accounting based variables at the 
time of prior earnings announcement.  I also take the logarithm of size and StdVol, since 
these measures are highly skewed.  
III.3   Empirical Results 
Table III.1 reports the descriptive statistics on pre-announcement, post-
announcement and benchmark period insider trading before and after Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The table also includes the differences of means tests for insider trading variables 
before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
The first three rows report the frequency of insider transactions around earnings 
announcements. The proportion of earnings announcements accompanied by pre-
announcement insider trading declined 5% after the Act. The proportion of earnings 
announcements accompanied by insider purchases in the pre, post and benchmark 
periods declined after the Act. On the other hand, the proportion of earnings 
announcements accompanied by insider sales in the post-announcement and benchmark 
periods increased after the Act.  
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The last four rows of Table III.1 report the number of insider transactions and the 
number of shares insiders traded around earnings announcements. The results for insider 
purchases are similar to frequency based measures, confirming that insiders purchase 
less after the Act. On the other hand, the mean number of insider sales and number of 
shares sold by insiders in all pre, post and benchmark windows increased after the Act.  
To summarize, the Act deterred insider purchases and the incidences of pre-
announcement insider trading. While the Act did not deter insider sales, it seem to have 
an affect on timing of insider sales. Note that insider sales may be based on information 
or due to insiders’ liquidity needs. Hence, this univariate statistics may hide the 
incidences of informed sales.  The increased visibility of insider transactions after the 
Act may cause insiders to avoid insider sales prior to negative earnings announcement.  
In the next section, I investigate insider purchases and sales around positive and negative 
earnings surprises.  
III.3.A  Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires expedited disclosure of insider transactions and 
hence the Act is likely to deter insider trading on price relevant information. This should 
imply that the positive relation between insider trading and future earnings surprises is 
weaker after the Act. In this section, I first investigate the affects of the Act on insider 
trading activity around positive and negative earnings surprises through univariate
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TABLE III.1:   Descriptive Statistics on Insider Trading Before and After Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
This table describes insider trading activity around the earnings announcements before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Before Sox and After Sox include 
quarterly earnings announcements in four years around the Act (1996-1999 and 2003-2006 respectively).  Pre-announcement period includes thirty days 
([t-32, t-2]) before an earnings announcement. Post-announcement period includes thirty days ([t+2, t+32]) after an earnings announcement. Benchmark 
period includes approximately thirty days between the prior quarter's post-announcement period and the pre-announcement period. ***, **, * denote 
significantly different from Before Sox mean at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
Pre Announcement Post Announcement Benchmark
Before 
Sox
N=5,116
After
Sox 
N=5,279   Difference % Change
Before 
Sox
N=5,116
After
Sox 
N=5,279   Difference % Change
Before 
Sox
N=5,116
After
Sox 
N=5,279   Difference % Change
Frequency of Earnnings Annoncements 
with Insider Transactions 0.154 0.104*** -0.050 -32.45% 0.429 0.423 -0.005 -1.24% 0.259 0.258 -0.002 -0.60%
Frequency of Earnnings Annoncements 
with Insider Purchases 0.062 0.013*** -0.049 -78.49% 0.176 0.105*** -0.072 -40.67% 0.101 0.038*** -0.063 -62.10%
Frequency of Earnnings Annoncements 
with Insider Sales 0.100 0.093 -0.007 -7.01% 0.306 0.357*** 0.051 16.78% 0.180 0.231*** 0.051 28.32%
Mean Number of "Purchase" Trades 0.135 0.031*** -0.104 -77.17% 0.411 0.255*** -0.155 -37.83% 0.237 0.087*** -0.150 -63.37%
Mean Number of "Sale" Trades 0.358 1.030*** 0.672 187.56% 1.737 4.659*** 2.922 168.15% 0.666 2.421*** 1.754 263.41%
Mean Volume of  Shares Purchased 549 136*** -414 -75.28% 2,368 1,276*** -1,092 -46.13% 2,284 418*** -1,865 -81.68%
Mean Volume of  Shares Sold 3,507 4,849** 1,342 38.25% 22,386 32,081*** 9,696 43.31% 7,783 13,005*** 5,222 67.09%  
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analysis. Then, I more formally investigate the affects of the Act on the relation between 
insider trading and earnings surprises. and on the relation between price reactions to 
earnings surprise and insider trading.   
III.3.A.1  Tests of Act’s Effects on Pre and Post Announcement Insider Trading 
The expedited and on-line disclosure of insider trading makes insider 
transactions more visible. Hence, the Act not only decreases the information advantage 
of insiders but also increases the likelihood of legal sanctions for insiders. The Act is 
likely to deter insiders’ informed trades. In this section, I investigate insider trading in 
pre and post-announcement periods differentiating among positive and negative earnings 
surprises. 
Insider sales may be based on both their information and due to liquidity needs. 
On the other hand insider purchases are more likely to be informed given their high 
exposure company stock and their diversification needs. In these univariate tests, I view 
the insider purchases (sales) before positive (negative) earnings announcements as 
informed insider trading.  
Panel A of Table III.2, reports the changes in the frequency of insider selling and 
buying around negative and positive earnings surprises after the Act. After the Act, the 
incidences of insider selling prior to negative earnings surprise decreased to 6.53% from 
7.86% (a 17.2% decline compared to before the Act). The incidences of insider 
purchases before positive earnings announcements decreased after the Act (a 76.2% 
decline compared to that of pre-Act period). These findings show that the Act deterred
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TABLE III.2:   Univariate Tests of Pre-Announcement and Post-Announcement Informed Insider Trading 
Panel A describes the frequency of insider trading in the pre-announcement and post-announcement periods of positive and negative earnings surprises. 
Before Sox and After Sox include quarterly earnings announcements in four years around the Act (1996-1999 and 2003-2006 respectively). Pre-
announcement period includes thirty days ([t-32, t-2]) before an earnings announcement. Post-announcement period includes thirty days ([t+2, t+32]) 
after an earnings announcement. Benchmark period includes approximately thirty days between the prior quarter's post-announcement period and the 
pre-announcement period. Surprise is the actual earnings minus median analyst forecasts scaled by the price at the end of earnings quarter. Panel B and 
Panel C reports the number insider transactions and share volume of insider transactions around positive and negative earnings surprises. ***, **, *  
denote significantly different from Before Sox mean at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Panel A:  Frequency
Negative Earnings Surprises Positive Earnings Surprises
Before Sox
N=1,373
After Sox
N=1,512 Difference % Change
Before Sox
N=3,059
After Sox
N=3,313 Difference % Change
Pre Announcement Selling 7.86% 6.53%* -1.34%* -17.02%* 10.91% 10.56% -0.35% -3.25%
Post Announcement Selling 24.02% 28.74%*** 4.72%*** 19.64%*** 32.49% 38.83%*** 6.34%*** 19.50%***
Pre Announcement Buying 6.72% 1.14%*** -5.59%*** -83.06%*** 5.67% 1.33%*** -4.35%*** -76.62%***
Post Announcement Buying 17.62% 9.68%*** -7.94%*** -45.05%*** 17.50% 10.73%*** -6.77%*** -38.67%***
Panel B: Number of Trades
Negative Earnings Surprises Positive Earnings Surprises
Before Sox
N=1,373
After Sox
N=1,512 Difference % Change
Before Sox
N=3,059
After Sox
N=3,313 Difference % Change
Pre Announcement Selling 0.379 0.369 -0.009 -2.45% 0.374 1.210** 0.837** 223.86%**
Post Announcement Selling 1.407 3.555*** 2.148*** 152.63%*** 1.895 5.255*** 3.360*** 177.26%***
Pre Announcement Buying 0.139 0.046* -0.094* -67.30%* 0.100 0.022*** -0.077*** -77.60%***
Post Announcement Buying 0.419 0.255** -0.164** -39.10%** 0.403 0.264** -0.139** -34.45%**
Panel C: Number of Shares
Negative Earnings Surprises Positive Earnings Surprises
Before Sox
N=1,373
After Sox
N=1,512 Difference % Change
Before Sox
N=3,059
After Sox
N=3,313 Difference % Change
Pre Announcement Selling 4,345 3,023 -1,323 -30.43% 3,378 5,772** 2,394** 70.89%**
Post Announcement Selling 15,176 25,124** 9,948** 65.55%** 24,041 34,931*** 10,890*** 45.30%***
Pre Announcement Buying 580 203** -377** -64.99%** 314 108** -206** -65.61%**
Post Announcement Buying 2,775 1,898 -876 -31.58% 1,568 1,049* -519* -33.12%*  
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insider transactions which may be claimed to be based on private information and 
subject to legal sanctions.   
Insiders may also exploit their information advantage by deferring their trades. 
These types of transactions include insider sales after positive earnings surprises and 
insider purchases following negative earnings surprises. An insider who is planning to 
sell his shares may defer his sale until after the positive earnings announcement. And 
this type behavior is difficult to catch for legislators as insiders can always argue that 
they need liquidity. Interestingly, this type of transactions increased after the Act. 
Frequency of insider sales after positive earnings surprises increased 19.50% compared 
to pre-Act period. However, this increase in frequency of insider sales after positive 
earnings announcements is less then the increase in frequency of other insider sales.  The 
insiders may also profit by deferring their purchase transactions until after negative 
earnings surprises. The results show that insider purchases after negative earnings 
surprises decreased 45.5% after the Act. 
Panel B and Panel C of Table III.2 report insider trading activity around positive 
and negative earnings announcements based on number of trades and number shares. 
The results are similar to statistics reported based on frequency of insider transactions in 
Panel A. To summarize, the Act deterred insider trading prior to earnings announcement 
(i.e., insider sales (purchases) prior to negative (positive) earnings surprises ) that are 
likely to be claimed as information based insider trading.   
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III.3.A.2  Descriptive Statistics on Earnings Surprises and Other Control Variables 
 I report descriptive statistics for independent variables in Panel A of Table III.3 
The first two columns report the mean and differences of means test for earnings’ 
surprise and markets response to earnings surprise (CAR). The mean of Surprise and 
CAR before and after the Act are not statistically different. The mean of other control 
variables are statistically different before and after the Act. Hence, it is important to 
control for these factors while testing the effects of the Act on the relation between 
insider trading and earnings surprises.  
 I report the correlations between earnings surprises and insider trading variables 
in Panel B of Table III.3. The correlations between earnings surprises and insider trading 
variables are quite low.   
III.3.A.3  Pre-Announcement Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises  
If insiders trade on private information on upcoming earnings announcements, 
then insider trading will be positively related to earnings surprises. To the extend the Act 
deterred insider transactions on private information, the positive relation between insider 
trading and earnings surprises will be weaker after the Act  than it was before the Act. In 
this section, I investigate insider trading prior to quarterly earnings announcements and 
earnings surprises. Specifically, I run the following firm-fixed effects regression: 
(7) 
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TABLE III.3:   Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
Panel A describes the independent variables used in multivariate analysis. Before Sox and After Sox 
include quarterly earnings announcements in four years around the Act (1996-1999 and 2003-2006 
respectively). Surprise is the actual earnings minus median analyst forecasts scaled by the price at the end 
of earnings quarter. CAR is three day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings 
announcements. The abnormal return is size and book to market adjusted return (using six Fama-French 
size and book-to market portfolios). Size is defined as market value (in millions) of equity. B/M is the 
book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity. R&D is the research and development expense 
(scaled by sales). Post6ret is the size deciles adjusted returns from two days after the earnings 
announcement to six months after the announcement. Pre6ret is size deciles adjusted returns from six 
months prior to the announcement to two days prior to earnings announcement. StdVol is standard 
deviation of daily share volume during three months prior to earnings announcement. Panel B reports the 
correlations between Surprise and insider trading variables. Surprise is the actual earnings minus median 
analyst forecasts scaled by the price at the end of earnings quarter.  Net Purchase Ratio is defined as the 
ratio of net insider purchases (number of shares purchased – number of shares sold) over total insider 
transactions (number of shares purchased + number of shares sold). ***, **, * denote significantly 
different from Before Sox mean at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
   Panel A: Independent Variables 
Before Sox After Sox
N=5,116 N=5,279
Surprise Mean 0.00108 0.00110
StdDev 0.00373 0.00393
CAR Mean 0.00012 0.00011
StdDev 0.00204 0.00212
Size Mean 6,391 8,990***
StdDev 18,178 26,149
B/M Mean 0.44194 0.49487***
StdDev 0.40804 0.65854
R&D Mean 0.39679 0.43626***
StdDev 0.48928 0.49597
Post6Ret Mean -0.01379 0.02533***
StdDev 0.28092 0.26688
Pre6Ret Mean -0.00060 0.03709***
StdDev 0.27500 0.30906
StdVol Mean 2.72708 3.97842***
StdDev 3.03460 4.20710  
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Table III.3 Continued 
  Panel B: Correlation of Earnings Surprises and Insider Trading 
Before Sox After Sox
Surprise q Surprise q-1 Surprise q Surprise q-1
Surprise q-1 0.28 1.00 0.21 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
NPR pre -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
(0.27) (0.52) (0.08) (0.00)
NPR post -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03
(0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.02)
In. Sales pre 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03
(0.42) (0.09) (0.37) (0.02)
In. Sales post 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
In. Purchases pre 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.87) (0.77) (0.65) (0.52)
In. Purchases post -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.26) (0.67) (0.65) (0.13)  
 
 
 
I include the insider trading during the benchmark period to control for 
autocorrelations in insider trading and the normal level of insider trading. The main 
variable of interest is Surprise. I also include earnings surprise in the previous quarter to 
investigate whether insiders trade on past earnings surprises. To observe the effects of 
the Act, I include an indicator variable that equals to one for observations after the Act 
and it equals zero otherwise (Sox). I also interact the surprise variable with Sox.  
The first column in Table III.4 reports the results from the regression that uses 
NPR as insider trading variable. The second and the third column report the results from 
regressions that use insider sales and insider purchases as the dependent variable. In all 
regressions the coefficients of Surprise and its interaction with Sox are insignificant.   
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TABLE III.4:   Pre-Announcement Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises  
This table reports results from firm-fixed effects regressions of pre-announcement insider trading variables 
on earnings surprises. In the first column Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) is used as dependent variable. NPR is 
defined as the ratio of net insider purchases (number of shares purchased – number of shares sold) over 
total insider transactions (number of shares purchased + number of shares sold). Second and third column 
uses number of shares insiders sold and number of shares purchased (scaled by outstanding shares) as the 
dependent variable. Surprise is actual earnings minus median analyst forecasts scaled by the price at the 
end of earnings quarter. Sox is an indicator variable that equals one if quarterly earnings announcement 
belongs to four years (2003-2006) after the Act and zero otherwise. Control variables are defined similar 
to Table 10. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
 
NPR Insider Sales Insider Purchases
Insider Trading Benchmark 0.1425*** 0.0965*** 0.1628***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Surprise q -1.2698 -1.2021 0.3024
(0.36) (0.57) (0.63)
Surprise q *Sox 0.4356 1.8823 -0.3208
(0.81) (0.50) (0.71)
Sox -0.0099 -0.0153 -0.0099***
(0.21) (0.20) (0.01)
Surprise q-1 0.4140 -4.7319** -0.4543
(0.76) (0.02) (0.47)
Surprise q-1 *Sox -1.8490 6.0969** 0.3982
(0.31) (0.03) (0.63)
PreRet6 q -0.0799*** 0.0596*** -0.0076
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
PostRet6 q -0.0005 -0.0204 0.0049
(0.97) (0.30) (0.40)
Size q-1 -0.0332*** 0.0058 0.0002
(0.00) (0.60) (0.95)
B/M q-1 0.0227* -0.0820*** -0.0004
(0.05) (0.00) (0.95)
R&D q-1 -0.0428*** 0.0041 -0.0009
(0.00) (0.82) (0.86)
Ln (STDVolume) 0.0134** 0.0235*** 0.0001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.96)
Constant 0.2036*** 0.0294 0.0104
(0.00) (0.72) (0.68)
Number of Firm Quarters 10,395 10,395 10,395
Number of Firms 432 432 432
R-squared 5.00% 3.00% 18.00%
 
 
  
53
The previous quarters’ Surprise is negatively related to insider sales. This 
suggests that insider sell less (more) after positive (negative) earnings surprises. The 
coefficient of the interaction of prior quarters’ earnings surprise and Sox is positive; and 
it is larger than the magnitude of the coefficient of prior quarters’ earnings surprise. This 
show that the relation between insider sales and earnings surprises in the previous 
quarter reversed after the Act. After the Act, insiders sell more (less) after positive 
(negative) earnings surprises. The coefficient of PreRet6 shows that insiders are 
contrarians. Insiders sell more after large abnormal returns.      
 The results in this section suggest that insider trading and upcoming earnings 
surprises are not significantly correlated in the late nineties even before the Act. In the 
next section, I investigate whether insider trading activity is driven by past earnings 
announcements.  
III.3.A.4  Post-Announcement Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises  
Insiders may trade on past earnings surprises rather than trading on upcoming 
earnings announcements. In this section, I investigate the relation between post-
announcement insider trading and earnings surprises. Specifically, I run the following 
firm-fixed effects regression: 
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TABLE III.5:   Post-Announcement Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises  
This table reports results from firm-fixed effects regressions of post-announcement insider trading 
variables on earnings surprises. In the first column Net Purchase Ratio (NPR) is used as dependent 
variable. NPR is defined as the ratio of net insider purchases (number of shares purchased – number of 
shares sold) over total insider transactions (number of shares purchased + number of shares sold). Second 
and third column uses number of shares insiders sold and number of shares purchased (scaled by 
outstanding shares) as the dependent variable. Surprise is actual earnings minus median analyst forecasts 
scaled by the price at the end of earnings quarter. Sox is an indicator variable that equals one if quarterly 
earnings announcement belongs to four years (2003-2006) after the Act and zero otherwise. Control 
variables are defined similar to Table 10. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
NPR Insider Sales Insider Purchases
Insider Trading Pre 0.1796*** -0.0439** 0.1566***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Insider Trading Benchmark 0.1064*** 0.0592*** 0.0472***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sox -0.0755*** -0.0144 -0.0496***
(0.00) (0.50) (0.00)
Surprise q -6.2334*** 0.6025 -5.3101***
(0.00) (0.87) (0.00)
Surprise q *Sox -4.8287* 3.2033 5.3985**
(0.09) (0.52) (0.01)
PreRet6 q -0.2559*** 0.2658*** -0.0263*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
PostRet6 q 0.0440** -0.0058 0.0630***
(0.03) (0.88) (0.00)
Size q-1 -0.0754*** 0.0752*** -0.0055
(0.00) (0.00) (0.53)
B/M q-1 0.0227 -0.0781** 0.0172
(0.20) (0.01) (0.19)
R&D q-1 -0.0332* 0.0099 -0.0141
(0.07) (0.76) (0.30)
Ln (STDVolume) 0.0317*** 0.0296* 0.0100
(0.00) (0.06) (0.14)
Constant 0.3780*** -0.4100*** 0.1000
(0.00) (0.01) (0.12)
Number of Firm Quarters 10,395 10,395 10,395
Number of Firms 432 432 432
R-squared 7.00% 1.00% 2.00%  
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Table III.5 reports the results from this regression. NPR is negatively related to the 
recent earnings surprises. After positive earnings surprises, insiders are likely to sell 
more or buy less.  The interaction of surprise with Sox is also negative. This suggests the 
above relation gets stronger after the Act. The insider sales are not statistically related to 
recent earnings surprises. However, insider purchases are negatively related to recent 
earnings surprises. Insiders purchase less after positive earnings surprises. The 
interaction of surprise with Sox has a positive and significant coefficient. This suggests 
that after the Act, insiders purchase more after positive (negative) earnings surprises. 
The results in this section show that insiders trade against the recent surprises.  
III.3.B  The Information Content of Earnings Announcements 
In this section, I investigate earnings response coefficients of earnings surprises. 
Less informed trading prior to earnings announcement implies that earnings 
announcements will be more informative after the Act. Givoly and Palmon (1985), 
Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Melbrouk (1992) suggest that insider trading leads to price 
discovery. However, if the Act deterred informed insider trading, then there will be less 
price discovery prior to earnings announcements and news component of earnings 
surprises will increase after the Act. 29 
I run firm-fixed effects regressions of CAR on earnings surprise, insider trading 
variables and other control variables. The regressions also include Sox indicator variable 
and its interaction with Surprise and insider trading variables. Specifically, I run the 
following regression equation: 
                                                 
29 The Act also requires better corporate governance mechanisms and more accurate reporting of 
accounting data. Hence, the news in earnings surprises is expected to increase after the Act.  
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The results are reported in Table III.6. The specification in the first column 
excludes the insider trading variables. The specifications in the second column use NPR 
as insider trading variable. The specification in the last column use insider purchases and 
sales as insider trading measure. The coefficient of Surprise is positive and significant in 
all three specifications. As expected the response of market is larger when there is more 
surprise in earnings announcements. The coefficient of interaction of Surprise with Sox 
is positive and significant. This shows that the response of market to earnings surprises 
become stronger after the Act. 
The coefficients for NPR and its interaction with Sox are not statistically 
significant. However, the coefficients for insider purchases and its interaction with Sox 
are significant in the third specification. The negative coefficient on insider purchases 
show that when insiders purchase more, there is smaller market price reaction to 
earnings surprises. This is consistent with the view that informed insider trading leads 
price discovery before the earnings announcements. The coefficient of the interaction of 
insider purchases with Sox is positive and significant.  The magnitude of this coefficient 
is larger then the magnitude of the coefficient of insider purchases (the sum of two 
coefficients becomes positive: -0.0312+0.1818=0.151). These suggest that the Act not  
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TABLE III.6:   Price Reactions to Earnings Surprises 
This table reports the results from firm-fixed effects regressions of three day earnings announcement 
returns (CAR) on earnings surprises and insider trading variables. CAR is the three day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements. The abnormal returns are size and book to 
market adjusted returns (using six Fama-French size and book-to market portfolios). Surprise is the actual 
earnings minus median analyst forecasts scaled by the price at the end of earnings quarter. Sox is an 
indicator variable that equals one if quarterly earnings announcement belongs to four years (2003-2006) 
after the Act and zero otherwise. Regressions in the second and third column include Insider Net Purchase 
Ratio, and Insider Purchases and Sales in the pre-announcement period. Other control variables are 
defined similar to Table 10. P-values based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
CAR CAR CAR
Sox 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.67) (0.72) (0.61)
Surprise q 0.1369*** 0.1371*** 0.1369***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Surprise q *Sox 0.0219** 0.0219** 0.0223**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PreRet6 q -0.0525*** -0.0514*** -0.0527***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size q-1 -0.0125*** -0.0122*** -0.0121***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
B/M q-1 0.0004 0.0003 0.0008
(0.94) (0.96) (0.90)
R&D q-1 0.0195*** 0.0197*** 0.0196***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
NPR Pre 0.0045
(0.51)
NPR Pre *Sox 0.0027
(0.80)
Insider Sales Pre 0.0029
(0.52)
Insider Sales Pre * Sox -0.0095
(0.20)
Insider Purchases Pre -0.0312***
(0.01)
Insider Purchases Pre * Sox 0.1818***
(0.00)
Constant 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Number of Firm Quarters 10,395 10,395 10,395
Number of Firms 432 432 432
R-squared 8.00% 8.00% 8.00%  
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only deterred price discovery through insider purchases but actually insider purchases 
seem to add more surprise to earnings announcement after the Act.  
To summarize, I document that news in earnings surprises increased after the 
Act. I also find little evidence that decline in insider trading contributed more 
informative earnings announcements after the Act.   
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Insider trading may convey information to the market and promote accurate 
pricing of stocks. In this dissertation, I investigate two special issues on insider trading at 
the turn of the century. The title of the first essay is “Insider Trading During the 
Technology Bubble”, the title of the second essay is “Insider Trading and Earnings 
Surprises: The Case of Expedited Disclosure of Insider Transactions”.  
IV.1   Insider Trading During the Technology Bubble 
Recent studies document that hedge funds and institutional investors traded 
differently during the late 1990s and their trading activity contributed to the rise of 
technology stock prices. Insiders, with superior information, are generally referred to as 
informed traders. This study investigates insider trading activity during the rise of 
technology stock prices. The results show that tech-insiders were heavy sellers during 
ten months prior to the price peaks during which prices more then doubled.  
The cross sectional tests show that abnormal insider sales prior to the peaks were 
large even after controlling for portfolio rebalancing needs of insiders. Moreover, the 
tech-stocks that are sold by insiders more extensively before the peaks had large price 
declines after the peaks. These findings suggest that burst of the bubble was not a 
surprise for technology stock insiders. 
This study also makes use of intraday data and investigates the relation between 
insider trading and net order flow. I document that the net order flow is positively related 
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to abnormal insider trading activity. However, this positive relation becomes weaker in 
the peak period; which implies less price discovery through insider trading during the 
rise of technology stock prices. 
The overall evidence of this essay is consistent with the view that insiders’ 
information was not fully and timely incorporated to the prices during the rise of 
technology prices. Complementing limits to arbitrage literature that recognizes different 
factors to explain recent technology bubble; this essay highlights another missing factor 
during the bubbles. 
IV.2   Insider Trading and Earnings Surprises: The Case of Expedited Disclosure 
of Insider Transactions 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires expedited and on-line disclosure of 
insider transactions and hence increases the visibility of insider trading. The Act not only 
reduces informational advantage of insiders but also increases the likelihood of legal 
sanctions for insiders. As a consequence, the Act is likely to deter insider trading and the 
price discovery through insider trading. 
This study investigates how the expedited disclosure requirements introduced by 
the Act affected insider trading behavior around earnings announcements. I show that 
the Act has a significant impact on insider trading behavior. In particular, I document 
that insider purchases significantly declined after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition, 
the incidences of insider purchases (sales) prior to positive (negative) earnings surprises 
declined after the Act.  
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I also investigate the relation among insider trading, earnings surprises and price 
reactions to earnings announcements before and after the Act. I find that that the 
earnings announcements become more informative after the Act which is consistent with 
less informed trading and less price discovery prior to earnings announcements. 
However, there is little evidence that the decline in insider trading contributed to more 
informative earnings announcements after the Act. 
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